Statistical analyses of data often add some additional constraints to a theory and leave out others, so as to convert the theory into a testable hypothesis. In the case of binary data, such as yes/no responses, or such as the presence/absence of a symptom or a behavior, theories often actually predict that certain response probabilities change monotonically in a specific direction and/or that certain response probabilities are bounded from above or below in specific ways. A regression analysis is not really true to such a theory in that it may leave out parsimonious constraints and in that extraneous assumptions like linearity or log-linearity, or even the assumption of a functional relationship, are dictated by the method rather than the theory. That mismatch may well bias the results of empirical analysis and jeopardize attempts at meaningful replication of psychological research. This tutorial shows how contemporary order-constrained methods can shed more light on such questions, using far weaker auxiliary assumptions, while also formulating more detailed, nuanced, and concise hypotheses, and allowing for quantitative model selection.
evaluate the hypothesis of a positive correlation). This hypothesis is not really true to the theory in that linearity is dictated by the method rather than the theory. As a consequence, additional assumptions like linearity or log-linearity may well bias the results of empirical analyses.
Researchers may relax the assumption of linearity by using various nonlinear or monotonic regression analyses. However, even the seemingly innocuous assumption of a functional relationship between X and Y may go beyond what is implied by a theory under investigation. Mathematically, if Y is a function of X, then two different stimuli with the same value of X must yield the same Y value. A theory might really just predict that Y increases whenever X increases, without actually predicting that Y is a function of X. Besides imposing a functional relationship, many estimation algorithms for regression models also rely on auxiliary assumptions such as homoscedastic and normally distributed random errors. When such assumptions are not genuinely part of the theory, they might well bias the results of empirical analyses.
In some cases, theories may also imply important constraints that cannot easily be captured in even a monotonic regression analysis. Some theories may imply upper or lower bounds on some, or possibly all, values of Y. Various theoretical nuances may imply that only some, but not all, changes in one or more independent variables go hand in hand with increased or decreased values of Y. For example, the theory may only imply that 'consistent' changes in two or more independent variables predict certain changes in Y, whereas, rather than imposing an additive, linear compounding or tradeoff rule, it may be silent on how 'incompatible' changes trade-off with each other.
Alternatively, a theory may predict that when an independent variable varies only within some threshold range, then Y can increase, remain constant, or decrease. However, within that small range of the independent variable, the only prediction may actually be that values of Y will not be 'too different' from each other either. Theories can imply a panoply of very nuanced predictions that, at best, may require mental gymnastics to capture jointly within the language of regression analysis.
This problem contributes to the adverse effects of mis-specified models on replication. Recently, psychology has directed much attention to the replicability of its findings. If a replication finds different correlation coefficients from one study to the next, does this mean that the underlying theory fails to replicate? What if the theory only predicts a monotonic, possibly not even functional, relationship? The potential biases due to extraneous assumptions may wreak havoc on replication studies: Failure to replicate a finding could be caused by a failure of the theory to replicate or it could be that the core theory is adequate and hence it's predictions replicate but that unwarranted auxiliary assumptions skew the analysis differently from one study to another. In other words, not only is it desirable to evaluate hypotheses that are genuine to the underlying theory to begin with, this imperative can be key to meaningful and informative replication studies.
In this tutorial, we are concerned with a specific type of theory: We are interested in theories that make predictions about how the probability of a certain behavior, symptom, or response is bounded from above or below, or increases, decreases, or is unchanged across different conditions in which that probability is assessed from data. Through a series of Illustrative Examples, we argue that the predictions of such theories are more naturally interpreted in terms of order restrictions (i.e., equalities and inequalities) than equations (e.g., a linear or monotonic function). We then walk the user through the application of modern, order-restricted inference methods, which provide the machinery to confirm or reject such theories, and to select which theory, from among a set of competitors, best accounts for data. For computational considerations, we primarily consider cases in which the number of different response probabilities is relatively small and where the data include multiple observations for each response probability. Oftentimes that means we consider only a small number of levels of the independent variables, but not necessarily. While our approach also yields maximum likelihood estimates of such probabilities, subject to the constraints of a given theory, its main contribution is in testing the validity of such theories (i.e., hypothesis testing) and in selecting which theory, from among a set of competitors, provides the best account of the data (i.e., model selection).
Besides this introduction and the Conclusion and Discussion sections, the article has three core parts. We first set the stage by discussing several Illustrative Examples that motivate our later detailed application. In the Order-Constrained Inference section, we walk the reader through the fundamentals of a framework for order-constrained analysis of binary-response data, using both frequentist and Bayesian techniques. A Case Study rounds out the tutorial with the in-depth discussion and reanalysis of a regressionbased study from the literature, including background, seven order-constrained hypotheses, our frequentist and Bayesian analyses using public domain software, and a detailed interpretation of the results.
Illustrative Examples
To illustrate the very broad range of applications we have in mind, we now walk through several examples that we frame very differently and that also move further and further away from a regression model. For the sake of concreteness, they all use the values given in Table 1 , with the variables X, X=, XЉ interpreted in different ways. We later revisit these examples in the context of a concrete application. The first example, cast as a decision task, simply moves away from positive correlation to monotonicity. It states that the probability of a certain decision-making behavior is a monotonically increasing (but not necessarily linear) function of a certain feature of the decision task. This hypothesis also dispenses with the distributional requirements of a standard regression.
Table 1 Values of Independent Variables X, XЈ, and XЉ for Stimuli/Conditions 1-5 in a Study
Stimulus/Condition i: 1 2 3 4 5 X i 300 100 33 100 100 X i Ј 9 9 9 1 3 6 X i Љ 1 3 9 1 6 This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Decision Making
Suppose that X i is the riskiness of choice option i, the dependent variable is the probability of choosing the safe option in a binary choice between the risky option and a safe alternative. The theory may predict that the probability P i of choosing the safe option is a monotonically increasing function of the riskiness. For the values of X in Table 1 this means that 0 Յ P 3 Յ P 2 ϭ P 4 ϭ P 5 Յ P 1 Յ 1.
Our second example is cast as a cognitive task. It states that the probability of a performance error varies in a monotonic fashion with a certain feature, but it drops the requirement that this relationship is even a function.
Learning
X i = could be the number of distractors in a learning task i and the dependent variable could be the probability of making an error in solving the task. The theory may predict that the more distractors there are, the less likely it is that a person correctly learns the task. At the same time, the theory might not require the probability P i of making an error to be a function of the number of distractors. For the values of X= in Table 1 this means that 0 Յ P 4 Յ {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } Յ P 5 Յ 1, where any of P 1 , P 2 , P 3 may be smaller than, equal to, or larger than any other.
We frame the third example in a consumer behavior paradigm. We consider a theory that says that two features of homes in a college town each affect the probability of home sales, but which is mute about how those features trade off. In other words, the theory constrains sale probabilities only where these features do not vary in incompatible ways. Therefore, an appropriate specification does not impose a linear relationship, nor does it specify at all how the two features attenuate each other when changing in incompatible directions.
Consumer Behavior
Suppose that X i is the energy efficiency of house i and X i Љ its distance to campus. The dependent variable could be the probability of selling the house. The theory may predict that more efficient houses and/or houses closer to campus are more likely to sell, without specifying how these two features trade off with each other when changing in an incompatible way. For the values of X and XЉ in Table 1 , this means that, because Houses 1 and 4 are equally close to campus, it must be that 0 Յ P 4 Յ P 1 Յ 1, on the basis of efficiency. Likewise, because Houses 2, 4, and 5 are equally efficient, it must be that 0 Յ P 5 Յ P 2 Յ P 4 Յ 1 on the basis of distance to campus. Taking into account that increasing efficiency and getting closer to campus creates no conflict, the theory predicts that this combination also increases the probability of a sale. Hence, 0 Յ P 3 Յ P 5 Յ P 1 Յ 1 for Houses 1, 3, and 5; 0 Յ P 3 Յ P 2 Յ P 1 Յ 1, for Houses 1, 2, and 3; as well as 0 Յ P 3 Յ P 4 Յ 1, for Houses 3 and 4. All in all, the prediction is that 0 Յ P 3 Յ P 5 Յ P 2 Յ P 4 Յ P 1 Յ 1. The fact that this theory yields a full ranking on these probabilities is a coincidence of the stimuli. For testing theories that are mute on how features trade off, careful attention should be paid to stimulus design to ensure that the theory constrains the response probabilities adequately.
The fourth example moves to a neuropharmacology frame. Here, we look at a hypothesis that a symptom is generally more likely for higher doses of a drug, but we show how to incorporate several nuances into that hypothesis. First, we propose upper and lower bounds on the percentage of a population showing the symptom regardless of the dose. Second, we capture the idea that the symptom is only predicted to be more likely for higher doses of the drug for people who differ substantially by another criterion, and even then, it need not be a function of the dose. Third, we incorporate the notion that the symptom rate, while possibly varying in any direction, nonetheless does not vary strongly for similar people.
Neuropharmacology
Let X i be the dose of a drug administered to subject group i and XЉ be the level of a certain hormone, and the dependent variable the probability of displaying a certain symptom. The theory may specify that, regardless of medication and hormone level, at least 10% of the population show the symptom and at least 10% show no symptom. It may predict that, for subjects whose hormone level differs by at least 2 1 2 units, the probability of the symptom increases with the dose of the drug, but not necessarily as a function of the dose. Furthermore, the theory might predict for subjects whose hormone level differs by no more than 2 1 2 units that the probability of the symptom need not be monotonically related to the drug dose, but that it also does not vary by more than 10 percentage points. The upper and lower bounds translate into the conditions that 0.10 Յ {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 } Յ 0.90. The predictions for those with substantially different hormone levels state that P 3 Յ P 5 Յ P 1 , P 3 Յ P 4 , and P 3 Յ P 2 (and no other constraints because we are not requiring that the symptom rate is a function of the dose), whereas the predictions for people with similar hormone levels states that |P1 Ϫ P 2 | Յ 0.10 and |P1 Ϫ P 4 | Յ 0.10, as well as |P2 Ϫ P 4 | Յ 0.10.
Last, but not least, we consider a clinical intervention frame to illustrate other nuances involving thresholds within or beyond which a theory predicts qualitatively different constraints.
Clinical Intervention
Let X i be the duration of clinical intervention i and the dependent variable be the probability of being symptom-free 1 month after the intervention. The theory may predict that longer interventions lower the probability of the symptom, but without requiring that the size of the symptom-free subpopulation must be a function of the duration. Instead, the theory may predict that, for any two interventions of the same duration, the probability of drawing a symptom-free person in one intervention does not exceed 1.2 times the probability of drawing a symptom-free person in the other intervention. Additionally, the researcher may have reasons to expect that the symptom-free subpopulation for the longest intervention is no larger than 150% the size of the symptomatic subpopulation in the shortest intervention. The first set of predictions means that 0 Յ P 3 Յ {P 2 , P 4 , P 5 } Յ P 1 Յ 1. For the cases with equal intervention length, that is, for each distinct pair k, ᐉ ʦ {2, 4, 5}, the theory predicts that P k Յ 1.2 ϫ P ᐉ . Additionally, P 1 Յ 1.5 ϫ (1 Ϫ P 3 ).
In all these cases, simple correlations (including correlations of rescaled values) are not genuine to the theory. With the exception of the decision-making example, none of these theories even This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
require that equal values of X imply equal probabilities of symptoms, behaviors, or responses. Likewise, the theory may not specify exactly how different predictors trade-off or compound in every possible circumstance. There may further be additional predictions that are not naturally connected with a correlationbased framework, such as upper or lower bounds on some but not all response probabilities, and there may be various types of thresholds within or outside of which the relationships differ in qualitative ways. This tutorial shows how contemporary order-constrained methods can shed more light on such predictions. We walk through the process of formulating hypotheses in terms of order-constraints on binary response probabilities, and testing those hypotheses using a binomial model for binary response data. We demonstrate both classical hypothesis testing and Bayesian model evaluation and selection using a publicly available software called QTEST.
1 Our approach not only omits functional and auxiliary assumptions that are not genuine to the theory, it also allows the researcher to state far more nuanced hypotheses, to carry out quantitative model selection among hypotheses that are related to each other in intricate ways, and to do so in a fashion that penalizes flexible models while rewarding parsimonious ones.
Order-Constrained Inference
For the remainder of the article, we utilize the decision-making scenario to spell out basic concepts and to walk the reader through an illustrative Case Study in which we revisit a published study. We consider binary response probabilities in decision problems where a decision maker must choose one of two available options, say, one of two rewards. Without loss of generality, we consider binary forced choice between a risky and a safe option. While we need to keep track of the stimulus i, we can always focus on the probability of choosing the safe option in Decision Problem i, which we denote as P i . More formally, we let Z i be a random variable denoting the response on Decision Problem i, and define P i ϭ Prob(Z i ϭ safe option).
A Binomial Model for Binary Response Data
Empirical testing of hypotheses formulated as constraints on binary response probabilities requires a probability model that specifies how the probabilities are related to the observed data (binary responses). In decision making experiments, a typical approach is to use a binomial model (see, e.g., Regenwetter, Dana, & Davis-Stober, 2010; Regenwetter & Davis-Stober, 2017 , for a discussion, and a tutorial review, respectively). Formally, suppose that there are k decision problems, and let N i denote the number of observations for Decision Problem i, for i ϭ 1, . . . , k. Let n i denote the number of times the safe option was chosen in Decision Problem i, for i ϭ 1, . . . , k. If choices are independent Bernoulli trials with probability of success P i , then n i is distributed binomially in P i and N i . It follows that the likelihood function for a string of data n ϭ (n i ) iϭ1,...,k is a product of binomial distributions taking the form,
where P ϭ (P i ) iϭ1,...,k , and 0 Ͻ P i Ͻ 1, for i ϭ 1, . . . , k.
We refer to the model defined by Equation 1 as the unconstrained binomial model. Unlike the general linear model, which has one parameter for each covariate plus an intercept parameter, this probability model has one parameter for each decision problem. This is how we make the predictions more genuine to the theory: The parameters of the model are the binary response probabilities themselves. The predictions of a theory of binary choice probabilities, for the given set of decision problems, can be encoded in constraints on those parameters. Thus, each (in-)equality constrained hypothesis can be characterized as an order-constrained binomial model that is nested in the unconstrained binomial model. For example, Equation 1 with P constrained according to the inequalities and equalities given by 0 Յ P 3 Յ P 2 ϭ P 4 ϭ P 5 Յ P 1 Յ 1 in the Decision Making example define an order-constrained binomial model.
Stationarity and Independence
The likelihood function (1) holds the probabilities P i constant across observations and, by taking a product of response probabilities, treats multiple observations as stochastically independent of each other. Necessary assumptions about stationarity and independence depend on the data generating process. We consider several scenarios. Scenario 1. When the data generating process consists in drawing, for each observation, one respondent independently and randomly from that target population, and these draws occur simultaneously, then these stationarity and independence assumptions are rather innocuous. However, we need to consider what impact individual differences have on the order constraints on response probabilities. Let P i (r) denote the probability that Respondent r chooses s on Decision Problem i. Because respondents are selected independently at random from the target population, and because only one response is collected per respondent, the likelihood function for the data reduces to Equation 1 by letting (r) denote the probability of selecting Respondent r, and by defining P i ϭ ͚r ͑r͒P i ͑r͒, that is, P i the marginal (across the population) probability that s is chosen on Decision Problem i. In this case, if the theory predicts the exact same set of orderconstraints on all individuals, then any weighted (per index i) average of the P i , because it is a convex combination, will also satisfy the same order-constraints. For example, if every respondent r in a population R of m many people satisfies the predictions of the Learning example, that is, if 0 Յ P 4 (r) Յ {P 1 (r), P 2 (r), P 3 (r)} Յ P 5 (r) Յ 1 for every r ʦ R, then the averaged probabilities satisfy the same constraints, that is
1 A standalone version of QTEST with a graphical user interface, as well as the MATLAB code for a command-line version, are available at http:// regenwetterlab.org/software/qtest/ This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
In other words, the likelihood function (1) can be applied to a data generating process in which each response is from a randomly and independently drawn member of R. The same holds generally for a broad class of order-constrained models, namely any model with what is technically called a "convex parameter space." At the same time, if different people's response probabilities are characterized by different order-constraints, then, depending on the specifics of those constraints, the averaged probabilities might be characterized by orderconstraints that describe only some or even none of the individuals. This is part of a larger problem with individual differences in psychology (see, e.g., Regenwetter & Robinson, 2017 , for a related discussion in the context of decision research).
One can define the likelihood function equivalently without referring explicitly to P i (r) for every individual in the population by setting
where f i () is the proportion of respondents in R for whom P i (r) ϭ . Hence, when randomly drawing respondents, the quantity f i () is the probability of drawing a respondent from the population R who has the response probability in Decision Problem i. This formulation is particularly useful in the derivation of the likelihood function for Scenario 2, which follows.
Scenario 2. When each individual answers each Decision Problem i, but still only makes a single choice per decision problem, then different independence assumptions entail different likelihood functions.
..,k be the binary response pattern for Respondent d, and let { (d)} dʦD be the set of response patterns for all respondents in the sample.
First, suppose that the responses are conditionally independent, given the respondent. With this assumption we need to consider the distribution of possible vectors of response probabilities, as well as the conditional probability of a response pattern given any specific vector of response probabilities. Formally, let ϭ ( 1 , .
k be a vector of binary choice probabilities for Decision Problems 1 through k, and let f() denote the proportion of Respondents r in the population R for whom (P 1 (r), . . . , P k (r)) ϭ . In other words, f is the distribution of in the population. Then, the likelihood of the data given the distribution of probability vectors is given by
where the first product captures independent sampling of respondents, the integral captures the fact that we need to consider the distribution of all possible response probability vectors, and the right-most product captures the conditional probability of the response vector (d), given the binary choice probability vector , under the assumption of conditional independence. The complexity of Equation 2 goes beyond the scope of an introductory tutorial, but similar methods for performing order constrained inference apply. Second, suppose furthermore that choices are marginally independent: This means, for example, that the marginal probability (across the population) that the safe option is chosen on Problems i and i= is the product of the marginal probability (across the population) that the safe option is chosen on Problem i, and the marginal probability (across the population) that the safe option is chosen on problem i=, respectively. As we show in the Appendix, combining conditional independence with marginal independence allows one to simplify the likelihood function in Equation 2 to the original likelihood function given in Equation 1. We treat our Case Study below as an instance of Scenario 2. We will assume conditional independence and marginal independence and rely on the unconstrained binomial model of Equation 1, as well as its orderconstrained nested submodels, for the Case Study.
Scenario 3. When one or more respondents each give multiple responses to each decision problem, under the assumption that responses are conditionally independent given the respondent, a likelihood function analogous to Equation 2 applies. In this case, the right-most product in Equation 2 On the other hand, one may arrive at a likelihood function analogous to Equation 1 by dropping the assumption that respondents are selected randomly from a target population, and by limiting statistical inference to the respondents in the sample. Let D be the collection of respondents in the sample, let P i (d) denote the probability that Respondent d chooses s on Decision Problem i, and let P ϭ {P i (d)} dʦD . Then the likelihood function is given by
The likelihood function in Equation 3 accounts for individual differences by allowing each respondent to have different binary choice probabilities, but it does not specify the structure of those individual differences in the population. As a result, inference using this likelihood function extends only to the respondents in the sample, not to the population from which the respondents were drawn. This is the reverse of Scenarios 1 and 2 (under the assumptions of both conditional and marginal independence), in which inference can be drawn on the marginal, population-level choice probabilities, but not on the individual respondents in the sample. By considering a larger collection of response probabilities, the likelihood function in Equation 3 also has implications on the order-constraints. Here, one may specify suitable order-constraints on choice probabilities, separately, for each d, as well as, potentially, relationships among these choice probabilities across different Respondents d.
For a full-fledged tutorial on the role of stationarity and independence in a variety of probabilistic models of binary choice in the prior literature, see Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2017) . We now turn to standard tools for model evaluation and model selection, as they apply to order-constrained binomial models.
Evaluation and Selection of Order-Constrained Binomial Models
Evaluating order-constrained models and selecting among such models requires specialized procedures for order-constrained statistical inference. Several such procedures are available, each with its own advantages, disadvantages, prerequisites, and nuances of interpretation. Here, we describe three such procedures that complement each other well, have been prominent in the literature, and can be executed by the QTEST software. To keep this tutorial focused on theory testing, not on the details of order-constrained inference, which have been discussed at length elsewhere, we provide only a brief description of each method and refer the interested reader to appropriate sources for technical details. We also keep the discussion focused on cases where the appropriate likelihood function is either Equation 1 or Equation 3.
Classical hypothesis testing. There is a large body of literature on classical hypothesis testing of order-constrained models with categorical data (e.g., Barlow, Bartholomew, Bremner, & Brunk, 1972; Robertson, Wright, & Dykstra, 1988; Silvapulle & Sen, 2004) . The public domain software QTEST of Regenwetter et al. (2014) can test an order-constrained binomial model, generate maximum likelihood parameter estimates (conditional on constraints), and calculate a p value for its goodness-of-fit, provided that the constraints involve inequalities only. In other words, the prerequisite for the classical hypothesis test is that one cannot reformulate the model with a smaller number of parameters (see Davis-Stober, 2009 , for more details). Mathematically, this means that the order-constraints do not reduce the number of degrees of freedom of the model. Geometrically, it also means that the parameter space of the model is of the same dimension as the parameter space of an unconstrained binomial model. Such a model is called full-dimensional. For example, the collection of inequality constraints 0 Յ P 4 Յ ͕P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ͖ Յ P 5 Յ 1 in the Learning example above does not evoke or imply any equalities. On the other hand, the collection of constraints 0 Յ P 3 Յ P 2 ϭ P 4 ϭ P 5 Յ P 1 Յ 1 of the Decision Making example above involves both equalities and inequalities, which means that the model reduces the number of degrees of freedom. For example, we could consolidate the three parameters P 2 , P 3 , and P 5 into a single parameter without changing the model. This means, geometrically, that the parameter space of the model is of lower dimension than the unconstrained model. However, to our knowledge, there currently is no known algorithm for carrying out a classical likelihood-based hypothesis test for an order-constrained binomial model that, like this example, is not full-dimensional.
The advantage of the frequentist approach is that it is easy to implement, and the resulting p value is easy to interpret: A hypothesis is rejected if its p value is small enough (e.g., less than 0.05). It is important to note that p values cannot be used to compare hypotheses directly: If two theories both provide an adequate fit to the data (i.e., if neither is rejected) then the theory with the larger p value need not provide a better description of the data. In the special case of the general linear model, when the inequality and equality constraints are defined on population means, model selection can be carried out with the "generalized order-restricted information criterion" (GORIC; Kuiper, Hoijtink, & Silvapulle, 2011) .
Bayesian model evaluation. One can also test the goodnessof-fit of order-constrained models in a Bayesian framework using a Bayesian analogue of the frequentist p value. The Bayesian p value (Gelman, Meng, & Stern, 1996) takes a posterior predictive approach to testing the hypotheses under consideration. The basic idea is to compare the observed data with 'predicted' data generated from hypothetical replications of the same experiment that produced the observed data. Each hypothetical experiment first draws a parameter vector from the posterior distribution, and then generates hypothetical choice data via independent Bernoulli trials. Each set of such simulated data is called a posterior predictive sample. This simulation-based approach provides a baseline for the level of discrepancy one should expect between the data and model if the model were correct. The Bayesian p value is essentially the proportion of the hypothetical replications in which the discrepancy between the actual data and the posterior predictive sample is greater than the baseline. Thus, a low p value suggests a lack of fit, while a p value near 0.5 suggests adequate fit (see Myung, Karabatsos, & Iverson, 2005 , for details).
The main advantage of the Bayesian p value is that it does not require full-dimensional models. The main disadvantage is that computation requires posterior sampling, which can be slow and tedious for highly parameterized, highly constrained models. However, leveraging the work of Gelfand, Smith, and Lee (1992), Myung, Karabatsos, and Iverson (2005) described a Gibbs sampling algorithm designed specifically for order-constrained binomial models such as those that we consider here. QTEST uses this algorithm to compute the Bayesian p value. Like the frequentist p value, the Bayesian p value, while a reasonable measure of goodness-of-fit, is not comparable across different hypotheses.
Bayesian model selection. The most prominent tool for comparing models directly against one another is the Bayes factor (Kass & Raftery, 1995) . The Bayes factor is defined, for a pair of models, as the ratio of their posterior marginal likelihoods. The model with the higher Bayes factor is the one deemed to more accurately predict future data samples from the same process that generated the currently observed sample (Pitt & Myung, 2002) . The Bayes factor also has a straightforward interpretation as the relative evidence in the data for the two hypotheses (i.e., models) This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
in the pair. For instance, a Bayes factor of 10 means that one model is 10 times more likely than the other to have generated the data. When applied to order-constrained models, the Bayes factor incorporates fit and complexity in a natural way (Mulder, Hoijtink, & Klugkist, 2010) . Procedures have been developed for using the Bayes factor to test order-constrained hypotheses on group means in ANOVA models (Klugkist, Laudy, & Hoijtink, 2005) , on measurement means in repeated measures applications (Mulder et al., 2009 ), on contingency tables (Klugkist, Laudy, & Hoijtink, 2010; Laudy & Hoijtink, 2007) , on regression coefficients (Braeken, Mulder, & Wood, 2015) , on interclass correlations (Mulder & Fox, 2013) , in multilevel applications (Kato & Hoijtink, 2006) , and on parameters in structural equation modeling (Gu, Mulder, Deković, & Hoijtink, 2014; Van de Schoot, Hoijtink, Hallquist, & Boelen, 2012) . The Bayes factor has also been used to test orderconstrained binomial models in the judgment and decision making literature (Cavagnaro & Davis-Stober, 2014; Dai, 2017; DavisStober, Brown, & Cavagnaro, 2015; Heck, Hilbig, & Moshagen, 2017; .
When multiple models are under consideration, it is useful to compute the Bayes factor for each model relative to a common baseline. In the current setting, the unconstrained binomial model serves as a convenient baseline, as all order-constrained binomial models are nested within it. The Bayes factor for one orderconstrained model relative to another can then be derived as the ratio of their Bayes factors relative to the unconstrained model. Henceforth, when we refer to the Bayes factor for an orderconstrained model, we mean with respect to the unconstrained binomial model (Equation 1).
QTEST implements two different algorithms for computing Bayes factors. For models with inequality constraints only (i.e., no exact equality constraints), it provides the "encompassing prior" method (Klugkist & Hoijtink, 2007) , which takes advantage of the fact that the order-constrained models are nested in the unconstrained (i.e., encompassing) model. In this method, the prior and posterior distributions for the unconstrained binomial model are referred to as the encompassing prior and posterior. As described more fully in Klugkist and Hoijtink (2007) , the Bayes factor for a full-dimensional order-constrained model is equal to the ratio of two proportions: the proportion of the encompassing prior in agreement with the inequality constraints, and the proportion of the encompassing posterior distribution in agreement with the inequality constraints. This algorithm requires running QTEST within a MATLAB environment. The stand-alone version of QTEST (as well as the MATLAB version) interfaces with a different algorithm for computing the Bayes factor (relative to the unconstrained model) that uses direct simulation of the posterior marginal likelihoods of the data given the models. That is, it obtains the posterior marginal likelihoods via Monte Carlo integration of the likelihood function over the appropriately constrained (or unconstrained) prior, and then computes the Bayes factor as the ratio of the posterior marginal likelihoods. This algorithm is appropriate for order-constrained models with or without equality constraints (see also Zwilling et al., 2018 , for a comprehensive tutorial on QTEST 2.0).
In any tutorial involving Bayes factor calculations, it is important to give careful consideration to the prior distribution. QTEST assumes a uniform prior with support over the probabilities that are consistent with the (in)equality constraints. Formally, if H is an order-constrained hypothesis about binary choice probabilities and
k is the subset of binary-choice probabilities that are consistent with H, the prior is defined as k , and so the prior is uniform over the entire space of binary-choice probabilities. This prior is uninformative in the sense that it expresses no preference for specific combinations of binary-choice probabilities. The uniform prior can be expressed as a Beta distribution with unit parameters, which is conjugate to the binomial likelihood function. This enables speedy computation of the posterior distribution. Although models with equality constraints are known to be sensitive to the prior distribution used, other studies of similar models have found through sensitivity analyses that these differences are often small and often do not influence interpretation of the results. These have recommended a uniform prior . Other priors are possible in principle, but they can be very messy to define formally over arbitrarily constrained regions, and difficult to justify theoretically. McCausland and Marley (2013) provided a thorough discussion of alternative prior specifications for orderconstrained models of discrete choice. When running QTEST in a MATLAB environment, the user can, in principle, reprogram the code to capture different priors.
Case Study
We illustrate the elegance, simplicity, as well as quantitative capabilities of order-constrained methods by revisiting a published decision making study of Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004) that involved choices between gambles and sure rewards. Imagine being offered the choice between receiving $9 (sure-thing) or playing a lottery in which you have a 90% chance of winning $10 and a 10% chance of neither winning nor losing anything (gamble) . The expected value of the lottery is $9, thus matching the sure-thing. A standard quantitative measure of risk, as it is routinely used in economics and finance, is the variance of the gamble (VAR), in this case .9 (10 Ϫ 9) 2 ϩ .1 (0 Ϫ 9) 2 ϭ .9 ϩ 8.1 ϭ 9 (dollars squared). Standard economic theory says that, the higher VAR, the more likely a person is to prefer the sure-thing over the lottery with matching expected value. The coefficient of variation of the gamble (CV) is the ratio of its standard deviation over its expected value, multiplied by 100, in this case:
ϭ 33.33 (unitless). Weber et al. (2004) theorized that CV is more predictive of risk sensitivity in humans and animals than VAR, especially when decision makers learn the reward size and its probability through experience rather than from description. Weber et al. (2004) argued further for the plausibility of a linear relationship, as opposed to just a monotonic one, through a series of mathematical derivations based on very specific possible assumptions about utility, probabilistic choice, and individual differences. While these mathematical constructions served to justify casting the theory in a linear regression framework, they seem, to us, extraneous to the actual theory. Besides CV and VAR, Weber et al. (2004) were furthermore interested in whether the expected value of the lottery (EV) also affected the likelihood of choosing the sure-thing. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
As we understand it, their theory predicts, at its core, that the probability of choosing the sure-thing over the gamble, in certain experimental conditions, is monotonically increasing with CV, and possibly a monotonically increasing function of CV. The role of EV could take many different forms besides a component in a linear mapping. Weber et al. (2004) also seemed to suggest that, in those experimental conditions, risk sensitivity is neither increasing with, nor a function of, VAR. We show how to stay true to those theoretical claims by testing suitable inequality constraints directly. We find that certain substantive conclusions drawn by Weber et al. (2004) strengthen when we eliminate the looming question of whether the conclusions might be biased by assumptions that are imposed by a method but that are not genuinely part of the theory. Table 2 shows stimuli and data of Weber et al. (2004) . We concentrate on the data they collected at Ohio State University in their Experiments 1 and 2. (The online supplemental materials considers a somewhat larger collection of data, including a partial replication of Experiment 1.) In Experiment 1, 110 decision makers learned the possible outcomes of the lotteries, and their probabilities, through experience, whereas in Experiment 2 (55 participants), the outcomes and their probabilities were provided in the stimulus descriptions. In both experiments, each choice was between a sure-thing and a gamble (whose expected value matched the sure-thing). Under the assumption that decision makers would be more likely to choose the sure-thing when the gamble was perceived as more risky, the main research question was whether CV or VAR was more predictive of risk sensitivity. Therefore, Weber et al. (2004) constructed the stimulus pairs so that the CV and VAR of the risky gamble were negatively correlated, and they recorded the proportion of sure-thing choices (risk sensitivity) as the dependent variable. We treat this data generating process as a case of our Stationarity and Independence Scenario 2, and we make the assumption of conditional independence and marginal independence in our analysis below so that the likelihood function of Equation 1 applies. Weber et al. (2004) theorized that CV is more reflective of this perceived risk, and hence more predictive of risk sensitivity than VAR, especially when participants learn the choice environment through experience rather than description. Therefore, Weber et al. (2004) hypothesized that decision makers would be more likely to choose the sure-thing over the risky gamble when the CV was higher, but not necessarily when the VAR was higher, and more strongly in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. Weber et al. (2004) cast and tested these hypotheses in a linear regression framework. Specifically, they reported a positive linear relationship between risk sensitivity and CV in their experience-based experiment (Experiment 1). They also reported a positive linear relationship between risk sensitivity and EV, as well as a negative linear relationship between risk sensitivity and VAR, which they said was not statistically significant. In addition, they stressed that regressing risk sensitivity on both CV and EV for all nine stimuli in Experiment 1 accounted for more variance than regressing risk sensitivity on VAR and EV. Finally, they reported a negative correlation between risk sensitivity in experience-based versus description-based choice (Experiment 2).
Weber et al.'s (2004) Study and Data

Weber et al.'s (2004) Regression Analysis
Limitations of a Linear Regression Approach
The linear regression model assumes that the dependent variable (probability of choosing the sure-thing) is a linear function of the independent variable (either CV or VAR) up to an additive distortion by a normally distributed random error term with constant variance. There are various reasons, both statistical and theoretical, why this framework is not an ideal way to represent the theoretical predictions of Weber et al. (2004) in this empirical paradigm. For one, because choice probabilities are bounded by zero and one, either the error term must have zero variance, or the constant variance assumption must be violated when the dependent variable takes values near zero or one. 4 More importantly, the assumption that the relationship is a linear function is far stronger than the hypothesis that choice probabilities increase with CV or with VAR. The latter merely specifies an order constraint on the choice probabilities across stimuli, whereas linear regression implies that equal values of an independent variable produce equal values of the dependent variable, up to error, holding other independent variables constant. For example, in a linear regression model in which choice probability was increasing with both CV and EV, the increase in choice probability from Decision Problem 4 (CV ϭ 100, EV ϭ 1) to Decision Problem 6 (CV ϭ 100, EV ϭ 6) must be exactly 2.5 times the increase from Decision Problem 4 to Decision Problem 2 (CV ϭ 100, EV ϭ 3).
Part of Weber et al.'s (2004) motivation for hypothesizing that choice probabilities increase (approximately) linearly with CV was a reference to a version of Luce's choice model (Luce, 1959) in This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
their Equation 3. Letting X denote the riskiness of a gamble and letting P denote the probability of choosing the sure-thing rather than the gamble, this model states that
For fixed b, the probability P is a monotonically increasing function of X. This relationship is not linear in X, but it is approximately linear for moderate values of X. However, this model has another property that becomes quite important when the data consist of proportions: The arithmetic average of probabilities of the form in Equation 4 . Therefore, if all decision makers satisfy Luce's choice rule with X defined by CV or VAR, which are both fixed for any given lottery, but we allow individual differences in b, then Equation 4 typically does not hold at the population-level and may, therefore, be rejected when fit to proportions of a sample of people. Nonetheless, population-level choice probabilities P are still monotonically increasing in X.
5 Overall, because a theory of individual decision making should permit individual differences, a more genuine representation of the theory than Luce's choice rule is to only predict that P is either an increasing function of, or monotonically increasing with, X.
As an alternative to a linear regression analysis, we will show how to formalize Weber et al.'s (2004) research hypotheses directly, concisely, and faithfully as order-constrained models, and we report tests with the appropriate order-constrained methods.
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Beyond assuming a binomial model (1), these models do not require any additional theoretical assumptions, such as Luce's choice rule. They also capture nuances in the hypotheses, such as individual differences, that are not possible with linear regression, and they can be tested without introducing auxiliary assumptions such as normality and homogeneity of the error term. With this flexibility to capture nuances in the relationship between the variables, we are also able to entertain several different hypotheses in order to hone in on the best explanation of the data (for a discussion of the benefits of model comparison, see, e.g., Rouder, Engelhardt, McCabe, & Morey, 2016 , in the context of ANOVA).
Casting Off the Shackles of Regression: Seven Hypotheses
In the Illustrative Examples section, we considered five substantive stories and the constraints they implied for the information given in Table 1 . We revise these five hypotheses taking into account that the values of variables X, X= and XЉ in Table 1 match those of CV, VAR, respectively EV, in Weber et al. (2004) . On that basis, we formulate seven order-constrained hypotheses relating to Weber et al.'s (2004) study.
Below, using the decision problem labels we introduced in Table 2 , we will refer to these Bernoulli parameters as P AB , P CD , P EF , P GH , P IJ . Each of them is the probability of choosing the sure-thing in one of the decision problems. For example, P AB is the probability of choosing the sure-thing in Decision Problem 1 in Table 2 , which was a choice between alternatives denoted A and B. More precisely, P AB is the probability that a randomly sampled respondent chooses $1 for certain (Option A) when offered a choice between that and a gamble with a 10% chance of winning $10, otherwise nothing (Option B).
Hypothesis 1: P is a monotonically increasing function of CV:
Hypothesis 2: P is a monotonically increasing function of VAR: 0 Յ P GH Յ P AB ϭ P CD ϭ P EF Յ P IJ Յ 1.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 state that the sure-thing choice probability is a monotonically increasing function of either CV or VAR, respectively. This means that the sure-thing choice probability is greater in one stimulus pair than another if and only if the value of the independent variable is greater. In fact, Hypothesis 2 is precisely the hypothesis we explored in the Decision Making example of the Illustrative Examples section.
Hypotheses 3 and 4, below, relax the assumption of a functional relationship, stating only that the sure-thing choice probability increases monotonically with CV or VAR, respectively. In fact, Hypothesis 3 is precisely the hypothesis we considered in the Learning example of the Illustrative Examples section.
Hypothesis 3: P monotonically increases with CV, not necessarily as a function of CV:
Hypothesis 4: P monotonically increases with VAR, not necessarily as a function of VAR:
Hypotheses 1-4 provide concise order-constrained hypotheses that formalize the core questions of Weber et al. (2004) about the role of CV and VAR, without relying on the additional structure added by a regression framework. Weber et al. (2004) also asked whether EV plays a role as well in how many people choose the sure-thing. Based on a multiple regression analysis, they concluded that both CV and EV, but not VAR, contributed to the proportion of people choosing the sure-thing: They interpreted their findings as suggesting that higher CV leads to higher risk aversion (more people choosing the sure-thing) and higher EV leads to lower risk aversion (fewer people choosing the surething). Here, we avoid casting the combined relationship, and 5 Incidentally, for a theory of individual decision making like the ones considered by Weber et al. (2004) , it would be problematic to cast the theory as a population-level Luce's choice model. If population-level choice probabilities satisfy Equation 4, then (most) individual member's choice probabilities need not even increase with X, let alone increase linearly. 6 In this case, because the restrictions impose a complete ranking on choice probabilities from smallest to largest, a monotonic regression analysis using the well-known pooled-adjacent-violators algorithm (PAVA) would also be appropriate. PAVA is a weighted least-squares estimator, which can fit a piece-wise linear function to the observed choice proportions, with the restriction that the function is increasing monotonically with X. However, one requirement of PAVA is that the restriction must be a total order. Thus, although this approach would be applicable in this specific case, it does not generalize to the more nuanced theories that we have in mind. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
potential trade-offs, as a linear function. In our next hypothesis, we cast the spirit of the above statement as a set of order-constraints on the probability P of choosing the sure-thing.
Hypothesis 5:
The following three predictions hold jointly: (a) for two decision problems with the same EV, P monotonically increases with CV, not necessarily as a function of CV; (b) for two decision problems with the same CV, P monotonically decreases with EV, not necessarily as a function of EV; and (c) if a decision problem has both higher EV and lower CV than another, then P is lower.
This hypothesis mimics the Consumer Behavior example in the Illustrative Examples section and specifically avoids specifying what happens when CV and EV change in incompatible directions. Using the derivations we reviewed there in detail, the hypothesis states that
The remaining two hypotheses go into a level of nuance and detail beyond the discussion in Weber et al. (2004) and are not aimed at answering specific questions in that article. Instead, they illustrate the flexibility and elegance of the orderconstrained framework. Hypothesis 6 parallels the Neuropharmacology example above. First, it captures the plausible hypothesis that at least 10% of the population will choose the sure-thing, and that at least 10% of the population will choose the lottery, in both cases regardless of what lottery with matching expected value the sure-thing is paired against. Second, it encodes a version of the hypothesis that higher EV, but only by a sufficiently large margin, increases risk-aversion. Third, is spells out a hypothesis capturing the plausible conjecture that, when EV values are very similar, then risk-aversion may vary, but only slightly, in either direction.
Hypothesis 6:
The following three predictions hold jointly: (a) for each decision problem, at least 10% of the population choose the sure-thing, and at least 10% of the population choose the gamble; (b) for gambles whose EVs differ by at least $2.50, P monotonically increases with CV, not necessarily as a function of CV; and (c) for any two gambles whose EVs are within $2.50 of each other, P need not be monotonically related to CV, but it varies by no more than 10 percentage points.
Following the lines of reasoning detailed already in the Neuropharmacology story of the Illustrative Examples section yields the constraints
Last, but not least, Hypothesis 7 parallels the Clinical Intervention story of the Illustrative Examples section. It exemplifies two nuanced refinements of Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 7: (a) Hypothesis 3 holds, together with the following two additional refinements; (b) for any two gambles with an identical CV, the size of the subpopulation who choose the sure-thing in one does not exceed 1.2 times the size of the subpopulation choosing the sure-thing in the other; and (c) the subpopulation of people choosing the sure-thing for the highest CV value is no larger than 1.5 times the size of the subpopulation of people choosing the gamble for the smallest value of CV. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This means that
0 Յ P EF Յ ͕P CD , P GH , P IJ ͖ Յ P AB Յ 1, P CD Յ 1.2 ϫ P GH ; P GH Յ 1.2 ϫ P CD , P CD Յ 1.2 ϫ P IJ ; P IJ Յ 1.2 ϫ P CD , P GH Յ 1.2 ϫ P IJ ; P IJ Յ 1.2 ϫ P GH , P AB Յ 1.5 ϫ (1 Ϫ P EF ).
Evaluating Hypotheses 1-7 Using the QTEST Software
We show how to evaluate these seven hypotheses using the QTEST public domain software for order-constrained inference. We go through four steps. First, we show how to prepare QTEST for the analysis by defining the parameter space. Second, we show how to load the empirical data. Third, we walk the reader through the process of communicating the order-constraints to the software. Fourth, we walk through the execution of the frequentist and Bayesian analyses. Results of the analyses follow in the next section.
Preparing QTEST. The QTEST software can be run as a MATLAB program or with a graphical user interface (GUI). The GUI version, while more limited than the MATLAB version, runs as a stand-alone program without a MATLAB license. In either case, the software was designed to facilitate the construction and statistical analysis of certain order-constrained models of probabilistic choice in decision research. Figure 1 shows the GUI when starting up the program. We will not use all components of the software, which means that many of the features in the GUI are not relevant for our purposes here. Moreover, because the GUI was designed with certain domainspecific applications in mind, some buttons or windows may have labels that may seem to mismatch our use here. Nonetheless, it will be an effective tool for evaluating the various order-constrained hypotheses that we are interested in here.
We need to communicate to QTEST that we are using five Bernoulli parameters and we can tell it the labels we introduced in Table 2 . Figure 2 provides screenshots documenting how to enter the Bernoulli labels into QTEST: On the upper left of the GUI, in the area marked "Gamble pairs," the user clicks on the button marked "Change . . ." and enters the number 10 in a small popup window titled "Gambles" and "Number of gambles:" then clicks "OK." Next, the user checkmarks the pairs (A, B), (C, D) , (E, F), (G, H) , and (I, J) in the next popup window, and clicks "OK." After that, the upper left corner area of the GUI, marked "Gamble pairs," shows the five Bernoulli parameters as displayed in the right-most screenshot of Figure 2 . This completes the steps for defining the parameter space for QTEST.
Loading the empirical data into QTEST. The next step is to input the data into QTEST. We consider the data from two experiments of Weber et al. (2004) , as shown in Table 2 (the online supplemental materials provides the inferred choice proportions and additional data). Upon launching the software, the lower left of the QTEST GUI, marked "Data," is blank (Figure 3, left) . Clicking on "Enter . . ." opens a dialog box titled "Enter Observations" (Figure 3 , center) in which the user can input the number of times each option was chosen in each pair. For instance, in option pair (A, B) of Decision Problem 1, the Sure-Thing A was chosen by 75 participants, and the Gamble B was chosen by 35 participants.
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Clicking on the "Name . . ." button permits the user to give the data set a name in the popup window titled "Data Set," such as, in Figure 3 , the name "Exp 1." Because we are analyzing two data sets, the user can follow similar steps by pressing "Enter," "New Set" in the popup window, and "Enter" once more, to generate a second data set. The "Enter Observations" window will be prepopulated with a copy of the first data set, so the entries need to be edited to reflect the other data set (Figure 4, left) . Pressing "Enter" and "Name" again permits giving the second data set a name, such as "Exp 2" (Figure 4 , center). After having entered both data sets, the left quarter of the GUI looks like the right most screenshot in Figure 4 , in which the second data set is visible. The button with a blue up/down arrow, located below the data, can be clicked to toggle between data sets (the user should ignore the buttons we did not use, including the one that says "20").
Communicating the order-constraints to QTEST. We need to convert each hypothesis into a system of linear inequalities and linear equations, stated as matrix calculations. (Note that there are many ways to write the same information in this format.)
Hypothesis 1 
The data reported by Weber et al. (2004) only included choice proportions. We derived choice frequencies by multiplying the proportions by the sample size (110 for Experiment 1) and rounding to the nearest integer. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Hypothesis 2 states that
Hypothesis 3 states that
Hypothesis 4 states that
Hypothesis 5 states that
Hypothesis 6 states that 
Having cast the order-constraints as linear inequalities and equations, we encode these constraints in text files such as those shown in the screenshots of Figure 5 . The online supplemental materials includes information on how to create or cross-check these text files using other features of QTEST, and in a fashion that helps the user understand the order-constrained hypotheses in more depth. Here, we focus on the contents of the files. The first line of each file tells QTEST how many inequalities there are, followed by the number of binomial parameters. After a blank line, this is followed by the multiplicative matrix, another blank line, and the vector of upper bounds. If the model involves equality constraints, as in This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Hypotheses 1 and 2, then there is an additional section titled "Equalities" followed by information that is organized in the same format as the inequalities section. Following that information are two more lines. One tells QTEST the dimension of the parameter space, the other one tells the program which coordinates to use (because some of them are redundant via the equality constraints). In our Hypotheses 1 and 2, the space is three-dimensional and we dropped two redundant coordinates in each case, keeping Coordinates 1, 3, and 5 for Hypothesis 1 and Coordinates 3, 4, and 5 for Hypothesis 2.
Executing the frequentist and Bayesian analyses in QTEST. To run a frequentist hypothesis test in QTEST, the user loads the order-constraints for said hypothesis from the appropriate text files by clicking "Load . . ." in the "Random Preference" section 8 of the GUI and selecting the appropriate text file in the appropriate folder, then choosing "All" under "Data Sets" and "Frequentist" in the "Hypothesis Testing" section of the GUI, and clicking the "Run Test" button. A popup window will show progress on the computation and, after a few seconds, the results will appear in the "Results" section of the GUI. These four steps are illustrated with the screenshots in Figure 6 . Clicking on "Export" will enable the user to save the analysis results in various formats, such as in a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet is organized in a self-explanatory way, so we omit a screenshot. The spreadsheet also reports maximum likelihood parameter estimates, subject to the constraints of the model. Note that the frequentist test cannot be applied to Hypotheses 1 and 2 because they are not full-dimensional (and the software would otherwise return an error message instead of running the analysis). Hence, we only apply the hypothesis test to Hypotheses 3-7.
To execute Bayesian analyses of all seven Hypotheses, the user needs to evaluate the amount of computation needed for the level of precision the user desires. The rate of convergence can be evaluated by using different numbers of iterations and rerunning the algorithms with different random seeds (see Zwilling et al., 2018 , for more details). For these data and hypotheses, we recommend setting the GUI to a "sample size" and "burn-in size" of at least 50,000 and 10,000, respectively, in the "Gibbs sampling" section (see Figure 7 for screenshots). After setting the sample size and burn-in size for the Gibbs sampler, the user proceeds the same way as for the frequentist hypothesis tests above, but using "Bayes p and DIC" in the "Hypothesis Testing" section of the GUI. On a 4.2 GHz desktop, this computation takes on the order of a minute for each Bayesian p value.
Computation of the Bayes factors proceeds analogously. However, for these data and these hypotheses, we recommend setting the sample size for the Gibbs sampler to at least 5 million. We omit screenshots for these steps. Computation time on a 4.2 GHz desktop is on the order of a handful of minutes, per Bayes factor. Table 3 shows the results of our reanalysis of the data from Experiments 1 and 2 of Weber et al. (2004) . Columns labeled "p value" show the frequentist p value. Columns labeled "Bp" show the Bayesian p value. Columns labeled "BF" show the Bayes factor versus the unconstrained model.
Results
For Experiment 1, consistent with the research hypotheses in the original study, we find clear and decisive evidence favoring Hypotheses 1 and 3 over Hypotheses 2 and 4. The frequentist p value shows a clear rejection of Hypothesis 4 but not Hypothesis 3, a finding that is reinforced by the small Bayesian p value. Although the frequentist p value is unavailable for Hypotheses 1 and 2, the Bayesian p value indicates a poor-but-adequate fit for Hypothesis 1, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
and a very poor fit for Hypothesis 2. We conclude that the data from Experiment 1 support the existence of a monotonic relationship between sure-thing choice probabilities and CV, but not between sure-thing choice probabilities and VAR. The Bayes factor allows us to further address the question of whether the relationship between sure-thing choice probabilities and CV is best described as a monotonically increasing function, or merely as monotonically increasing. To answer that question, we compare Hypotheses 1 and 3. Here, again, the result is decisive.
Hypothesis 3, which states a monotonically increasing relationship that is not a function, is 18.6/2.31 ϭ 8.05 times more likely than Hypothesis 1 (according to which the relationship is a monotonically increasing function), given the data.
We now turn to the question of which of the seven hypotheses provides the best explanation of the Experiment 1 data. We have already noted that Hypothesis 3 is the best of the first four hypotheses. Turning to our novel Hypotheses 5-7, we find that Hypothesis 6 is rejected by the frequentist p value (p ϭ .0019) and Figure 5 . Screenshots of the QTEST input files encoding the order-constraints of Hypotheses 1-7. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
that Hypothesis 7 fits very poorly according to the Bayesian p value (p Ϸ 0). On the other hand, Hypothesis 5 is well supported by the data. In fact, its Bayes factor of 37.9 is more than double that of Hypothesis 3. Thus, it is more likely that the Sure-thing choice probabilities are monotonically related to both CV and EV than it is that they are monotonically related to CV alone.
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In Experiment 2, which differed from Experiment 1 in that probabilities were conveyed by description rather than experience, each of Hypotheses 3-7 is rejected by the frequentist p value. According to the Bayesian p value, only Hypothesis 4 shows an adequate fit. However, the Bayes factor for Hypothesis 4 shows that it is worse than the unconstrained model. We conclude that in conditions of description, as opposed to experience, none of the hypotheses under consideration offer a viable explanation of Sure-thing choice probabilities, based on the Weber et al. (2004) study.
Conclusions and Discussion
There is much discussion in contemporary psychology about which findings are real and which are not. This has led to a flurry of activity, most notably the replication movement. In our view, an essential contributing factor to this crisis is that, ostensibly to make their theories testable and tractable, scholars frequently add constraints that are not inherently part of the theory. This raises an important question: When one knows that a theory is mis-specified, what does it mean to replicate or fail to replicate the result of an analysis? Having to qualify every theory and every empirical finding with the potentially mediating effect of extraneous theoretical assumptions ultimately renders both theory development and empirical analysis less tractable, rather than simpler. Replicating a study that has grafted strong extraneous assumptions on a core theory, such as a linear functional form, comes at the cost of hinging, once again, on that extraneous structure that is not part of the theory. As an alternative to replication, eliminating extraneous structure and evaluating the theory directly may be a more efficient and powerful way to determine whether a theory has real empirical support or not.
Contemporary statistics has opened up new avenues of theory construction and hypothesis specification. In particular, scholars can free themselves from the obligation to formulate functional relationships in situations when their theory really only specifies order-constraints on probabilities at its core. Using the theory and data of Weber et al. (2004) as an illustrative Case Study, we have shown, in particular, how contemporary psychological theory development can, in some cases, break off the shackles of regression models to test qualitative theoretical predictions directly and in a quantitatively rigorous and finetuned fashion. Such order-constrained models are expressed in qualitative terms that fit better into everyday language, whereas the more restrictive types of linear models are typically represented in mathematical terms that translate less easily into natural language. Linear regression is just one of many ways to formulate hypotheses about monotonic relationships. Likewise, testing main effects and interactions is often a roundabout approach to ultimately evaluating a pattern of inequalities that the theory genuinely predicts.
The framework we have spelled out here has strengths and weaknesses, with the latter being primarily computational bottlenecks for simulating high-dimensional joint distributions in the Bayesian analysis. Regardless of the number of independent variables, regardless of the number of levels of each independent variable, and regardless of the number of inequality and equality constraints, if the order-constraints on response probabilities can be cast in a space of sufficiently low dimension, then the analysis remains tractable (see, e.g., Regenwetter & Davis-Stober, 2012 , who ran full-dimensional frequentist hypothesis tests of 75,834 nonredundant joint inequality constraints in 20-dimensional space on the PC). As a rule of thumb, computation time for frequentist hypothesis testing and Bayesian p values typically appears to be linear in dimension, whereas computation time for Bayes factors appears to be typically exponential in dimension. In our illustration here, we computed Bayes factors on the GUI stand-alone version of QTEST in minutes in five-dimensional space, and in hours in nine-dimensional space (see online supplemental materials).
10
Related Work
Although we have considered theories that are formulated in terms of a continuous dependent variable (choice probabilities), and continuous predictors, our method works with data struc-9 In the online supplemental materials, we reconsider Hypotheses 1-5 on a larger set of data collected at two different locations, which includes choices on four additional decision problems. We also consider five new hypotheses that can only be assessed on the larger set of decision problems. In that analysis, we find that the best hypothesis is that sure-thing choice probabilities increase monotonically with CV alone (as in Hypothesis 3 here), but with the added nuance that choice probabilities on the same decision problem presented in different locations are equal. 10 Regenwetter et al. (2017) computed 159,000 Bayes factors of order-constrained models in nine-to 24-dimensional spaces using a more efficient supercomputer version of QTEST with a cost of 20,000 CPU hours. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
tures that could be presented in a cross-tabulation. This is because binary choice experiments typically involve repeated choices on a finite number of combinations of levels of the independent variables. For example, in the context of the Weber et al. (2004) study and considering only one independent variable, the rows would be the levels of the independent variable (e.g., 33, 100, and 300) and the columns would be the choice of either the risky option or the sure-thing. Then, theories under consideration amount to order-constrained hypotheses about proportions in the contingency table.
The data from binary choice experiments are not typically structured this way because the resulting contingency table would usually be very sparse. However, it is worth mentioning that Klugkist, Laudy, and Hoijtink (2010) presented a method for testing order-constrained hypotheses on contingency tables using Bayesian model selection (i.e., Bayes factors). Their approach utilizes a Dirichlet multinomial model, which allows the dependent variable to have any finite number of categories. In our approach, the dependent variable is binary, hence we use a beta binomial model that is a special case of the Dirichlet multinomial model. Our formulation of such hypotheses as Bayesian models, and our approach to selecting among them using the Bayes factor, can be considered a special case of the approach presented in that article. Thus, our examples highlight the generality of this approach by illustrating its application to theories of binary choice.
Blending Frequentist and Bayesian Methods
Our approach considered fixed order-constraints and drew a strict dichotomy between frequentist and Bayesian methods. However, some state-of-the-art order-constrained inference methods blend multiple approaches. For example, Karabatsos (2017) presented a hybrid approach for order-restricted posterior inference on a large number of binomial model parameters, where the actual order constraints on the parameters are not fixed, but instead are unknown and need to be estimated from the data. The approach employed approximate Bayesian inference methods to handle a model likelihood that is made intractable by the sheer number and complexity of the unknown order constraints. It used the frequentist "pooled-adjacent-violators algorithm" (PAVA) to obtain a smoothed maximum likelihood estimate, which provided the so-called "synthetic likelihood" for the approximate Bayesian inference. Dunson and Neelon (2003) also blended frequentist and Bayesian concepts. They considered linear regression with indicator variables for the different levels of the independent variable and aimed to test order constraints on the regression coefficients. They approximated the posterior distribution of the order-constrained (Bayesian) model by transforming the posterior distribution of an unconstrained (Bayesian) model, using a (frequentist) isotonic regression as a smoothing algorithm. Both of these approaches embedded traditionally frequentist techniques within Note. Values less than 10 Ϫ4 are rounded to zero. The Bayes factor for the winning hypothesis in each experiment is marked in bold. The "-" markings indicate that frequentist hypothesis tests are currently unavailable for Hypotheses 1 and 2. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Bayesian analyses so as to circumnavigate technical and computational challenges that can arise in a purely Bayesian approach to order-constrained models.
A Blueprint for Graduate Student Projects
As Iverson (2006) suggested in An Essay on Inequalities and Order-Restricted Inference, set in a very similar context as this tutorial, the seeds to any major transformation of research practices are planted in the classroom and in graduate school. The approach we have laid out offers a useful addition to replication studies: Besides rerunning a study that involved regressing response probabilities on quantitative independent variables, replication analyses could also evaluate how the original study, as well as the replication, would be affected by staying true to the theory at hand and evaluating only those order-constraints that are genuine to the theory. We have illustrated the nuances of such hybrid projects in our online supplemental materials. In our view, such endeavors provide an excellent blueprint for Master's theses or PhD qualifying articles, as it allows the students to dig deeply into the existing knowledge in their area of research and carry out constructive, yet also well delineated projects with good potential to be publishable. Because they permit much more nuanced analyses, such projects can contribute to the discipline's large-scale effort to reevaluate, and potentially strengthen or refine, existing theories in the field.
